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Global supply chains are prolific throughout modern business, provide
unique business advantages in a globalized economy, and should be pro-
tected to some degree by American antitrust law.  A supply chain is defined as
a “network created amongst different companies producing, handling and/
or distributing a specific product.”1  In its most basic form, a supply chain
encompasses each step from the supplier to the final consumer in the pro-
duction of a good or in the administration of a service.2  Globalization or the
use of a global supply chain refers to the practice of “sourcing, manufactur-
ing, transporting and distributing products outside of your native country.”3
Global supply chains have become an integral part of current business prac-
tice, specifically in the technology market.4  For example, in producing the
iPhone 6, Apple uses displays from South Korea, cameras from Japan, chips
from Taiwan, and manufacturing facilities in China.5
American businesses that utilize global supply chains are at a high risk of
being the victim of anticompetitive activity by foreign cartels.  Many busi-
nesses that hope to remain competitive in the globalized economy have
begun to expand abroad.6  A common organizational strategy involves the
establishment by a domestic parent company of a foreign subsidiary that acts
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2016; B.A., Biochemistry, Albion College,
2012.  I would like to thank Professor Joseph P. Bauer for his helpful comments, the Notre
Dame Law Review editors for their thoughtful revisions, and my family for their constant
support.
1 Definition of Supply Chain, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
supplychain.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
2 Id.
3 Dave Blanchard, How to Manage a Global Supply Chain, INDUSTRYWEEK (Aug. 15,
2012), http://www.industryweek.com/supply-chain/how-manage-global-supply-chain.
4 Next-Generation Supply Chains: Efficient, Fast and Tailored, PWC 5 (2013), http://www
.pwc.com/GlobalSupplyChainSurvey2013.
5 How and Where iPhone Is Made: Comparison of Apple’s Manufacturing Process, COMPARE-
CAMP (Sept. 27, 2014), http://comparecamp.com/how-where-iphone-is-made-comparison-
of-apples-manufacturing-process/.
6 See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir.
2014).
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as a link in the parent’s global supply chain.7  Generally, this allows the par-
ent to more efficiently manufacture a product, ease distribution, or gain
some other business advantage.8  However, an issue arises when the foreign
subsidiary is the victim of anticompetitive conduct abroad.  Does a domestic
company have a cause of action against a foreign cartel who violates the Sher-
man Act?  This is the issue at the heart of Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics and
similar cases: whether anticompetitive activity abroad which affects a domes-
tic company’s foreign subsidiaries can give rise to an antitrust claim in the
United States under the Sherman Act and the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (FTAIA).9
Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp.10 involved a domestic technol-
ogy company, Motorola Mobility (Motorola) that utilizes a global supply
chain to manufacture and distribute electronic devices, including cellular
phones.11  The defendants, AU Optronics Corp. (AU Optronics), sold LCD
panels to Motorola and its foreign affiliates to be incorporated into Motor-
ola’s phones.12  Motorola alleged that the defendants engaged in anticompe-
titive conduct by taking part in a global price-fixing conspiracy that resulted
in the price of the LCD panels rising to an unsustainable point.13  The Dis-
trict Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that
Motorola had failed to satisfy the FTAIA.  Motorola appealed the judgment
to the Seventh Circuit.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment but subsequently vacated its opinion and
granted rehearing.  Upon rehearing, the Seventh Circuit again affirmed the
District Court’s holding in favor of AU Optronics.
This Note seeks to establish that the Seventh Circuit should have held in
Motorola Mobility that the FTAIA’s “direct . . . effect” requirement is satisfied
when a foreign subsidiary suffers a harm due to anticompetitive activity
abroad and there exists a reasonably proximate causal nexus between that
harm and the domestic effect in the United States.  Furthermore, the “gives
rise to” requirement of the FTAIA sufficiently accounts for concerns of inter-
national comity and, under the facts of this case, causes Motorola’s claim to
7 See, e.g., id.
8 Global supply chains are advantageous to a business for a number of reasons.  They
allow a business to follow existing customers as they expand internationally.  Blanchard,
supra note 3.  They also provide the opportunity to “leverage . . . worldwide purchasing
power, reduce materials inventories, eliminate waste[,] and improve efficiency.” Id.  Fur-
thermore, effective supply chains and supply chain management are key components of
business success.  In a survey by Price Waterhouse Coopers, forty-five percent of partici-
pants saw their supply chain as a strategic asset. PWC, supra note 4, at 4.  Notably, those
who viewed their supply chain as an asset reported achieving seventy percent higher per-
formance in “on time in full” delivery and inventory turnover, which resulted in better
margins and had a significant impact on the bottom line. Id.
9 See Motorola Mobility, 746 F.3d 842.
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fail.  Part I explores the history of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its interna-
tional application before and after the FTAIA, beginning with American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. and extending through Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California.  Part II describes the statutory language of the FTAIA.  Part III
discusses the consensus of the circuits that, after Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the
FTAIA goes to the merits of a plaintiff’s claim.  Section IV.A will discuss the
recent circuit agreement regarding the second prong of the FTAIA—when
an injury “gives rise to” a claim under the Sherman Act.  Section IV.B will
analyze the two competing tests for determining whether the “direct . . .
effect” requirement—the first prong of the FTAIA—has been satisfied and
will argue that the “reasonably proximate causal nexus” test is the appropri-
ate standard.  Part V will apply this standard to the facts in Motorola Mobility
and will ultimately conclude that the “direct effects” requirement was satis-
fied but that the domestic effect failed to “give rise to” a Sherman Act claim,
with the conclusion that the Seventh Circuit should have administered its
holding in accordance with this reasoning.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY: THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT APPLIED ABROAD
A. A Strict Interpretation: American Banana
The international reach of the Sherman Act was first considered by the
Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.14  In that case, the
defendant owned banana plantations in Central America and was in the busi-
ness of exporting them to the United States.15  The plaintiff, a competitor in
the market, brought a claim in the United States under the Sherman Act.16
The Supreme Court determined that the Sherman Act did not reach acts that
took place in Panama and Costa Rica.17  Despite the fact that both parties to
the litigation were American corporations, the Supreme Court held that “the
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act
is done.”18  The Court further reasoned that to hold otherwise would result
in an “interference with the authority of another sovereign” and would be
“contrary to the comity of nations.”19
B. A Softening Standard: Alcoa and Timberlane
Over time, the strict interpretation of the international reach of the
Sherman Act gradually softened and courts began exercising jurisdiction
over certain extraterritorial actions that affected competition in the United
14 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
15 Id. at 354.
16 Id. at 348.
17 Id. at 357.
18 Id. at 356.
19 Id.
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States.20  Two important circuit court cases emerged before Congress passed
the FTAIA in 1982.  These are the Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)21 and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.22
In Alcoa,23 the Second Circuit was confronted with the issue of whether
the Sherman Act extended to a foreign subsidiary’s acts outside of the United
States when those acts had an effect on competition in the United States.24
In a landmark decision, Judge Learned Hand developed an intent/effects
test for determining when extraterritorial activity could be subject to liability
under the Sherman Act.25  Under this test, in order for extraterritorial activ-
ity to fall within the reach of the Sherman Act, the activities at issue must
have been “intended to affect imports” and must have actually affected
them.26  Judge Hand proceeded to determine that the defendant in that case
had both intended to affect and did affect the imports involved and was
therefore subject to the Sherman Act.27  Notably, the court did not address
what the outcome would be if only one of the elements was satisfied.28
In contrast, in Timberlane, the Ninth Circuit rejected the intent/effects
test articulated by Judge Hand.29 Timberlane involved a number of parties,
some principal, some subsidiary, some foreign, and some domestic.30  Ulti-
mately, it was determined that the defendants’ actions occurred primarily in
Honduras and that a majority of the effect was felt there as well.31  As a result,
the district court dismissed the case for its failure to satisfy the intent/effects
test.32  The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the test did not adequately
take into consideration a number of other significant factors, including com-
ity.33  As a result, the court developed a more nuanced approach, which
required three steps and the consideration of numerous factors.34  While this
approach may have offered a more tailored result on a case-by-case basis, it
was often criticized for the burden it imposed on courts and the inconsistent
outcomes it produced.35
20 Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really Want to
Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3, 7–8 (2012).
21 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
22 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
23 Alcoa was decided over thirty-five years after American Banana.
24 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421–22, 444–45.
25 Id. at 444.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 444–45.
28 Id. at 443–44.
29 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976).
30 Id. at 603–04.
31 Id. at 597.
32 Id. at 601.
33 Id. at 615.
34 Id.
35 See Bauer, supra note 20, at 9 (“While this far more nuanced approach had the
potential virtue of increasing the likelihood of reaching a ‘correct’ result, it was criticized
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C. Considerations of Comity: Hartford Fire
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California36 involved domestic and foreign insur-
ers and reinsurers who allegedly violated the Sherman Act by engaging in
conspiracies to affect the American insurance market.37  The London rein-
surers who were named as defendants did not contest that the court had
jurisdiction but argued that this was an improper application of the Sherman
Act to foreign conduct.38  While holding that this was not an improper appli-
cation of the Sherman Act, the majority addressed the FTAIA only so far as to
determine that considerations of international comity were not present in
the statute and therefore need not have been considered.39  However, Justice
Scalia argued in dissent that considerations of international comity—“the
respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their
laws”40—counseled strongly against application of the Sherman Act in this
instance.41  Relying on § 403 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, Justice Scalia determined that application of United
States law in that situation would have been unreasonable and should there-
fore have been avoided.42
II. THE FTAIA
In an attempt to resolve the conflict regarding the application of the
Sherman Act extraterritorially, Congress passed the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act in 1982.43  The purpose of the legislation was to codify an
effects test for determining the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.44
Congress had two primary concerns that led to the passing of the statute.
First, Congress was concerned that United States courts would be over-
whelmed with lawsuits regarding actions that had minimal effect on domestic
commerce and primarily served foreign interests.45  Second, Congress was of
the opinion that the inconsistent application of the Sherman Act internation-
by numerous courts and commentators for the increased burden it placed on courts and
parties, as well as the uncertainty of result it presaged.”).
36 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
37 Id. at 770–71.
38 Id. at 794–95.
39 Id. at 798.
40 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. (Empagran II), 417 F.3d 1267, 1271
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
41 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 819.
42 Id. at 818–22.
43 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, §§ 401–03, 96 Stat.
1233, 1246–47 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012)).
44 Morgan Franz, Comment, The Competing Approaches to the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act: A Fundamental Disagreement, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 861, 866–67 (2014); Edward
Valdespino, Note, Shifting Viewpoints: The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, a Substan-
tive or Jurisdictional Approach, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 457, 461 (2009) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-
686, at 2 (1982)).
45 Valdespino, supra note 44, at 461.
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ally was having a detrimental effect on international commerce.46  There-
fore, the FTAIA provides as follows:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations
unless—
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a per-
son engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of the [Sherman
Act], other than this section.47
The FTAIA begins by placing all extraterritorial activity other than
import trade and import commerce48 outside the reach of the Sherman Act.
It then pulls some activity back within the Act’s reach when two requirements
are satisfied.49  These two requirements comprise what is often referred to as
the “domestic effects exception.”  First, the conduct must have a “direct, sub-
stantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce,50 and
second, the effect must “give[ ] rise to” a Sherman Act claim.51  Three impor-
tant interpretive questions stem from the language of the statute.  Is the
FTAIA procedural or substantive?52  What constitutes a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect?53  And when does an effect give rise to a
claim under the Sherman Act?54
III. THE FTAIA IS A SUBSTANTIVE STATUTE
One issue that has been widely disputed is whether the FTAIA delineates
a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction or reaches the substantive merits of
a claim.  The Supreme Court addressed this issue generally in Arbaugh v. Y &
H Corp.55  A number of FTAIA cases both pre- and post-Arbaugh regarded
dismissals for failure to satisfy the FTAIA as dismissals for lack of subject mat-
46 Id.
47 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
48 It is outside the scope of this Note to establish what exactly constitutes import trade
or import commerce.  This Note is primarily concerned with the impact of the FTAIA on
anticompetitive activity in global supply chains.  U.S. purchasers operating global supply
chains rarely import or purchase goods directly from foreign sellers.  Instead, purchasers
often move goods purchased abroad through the supply chain until they reach the United
States.  This type of activity must satisfy the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception and does
not fall under import activity.
49 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
50 Id. § 6a(1).
51 Id. § 6a(2).
52 See infra Part III.
53 See infra Section IV.B.
54 See infra Section IV.A.
55 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
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ter jurisdiction.56  At this time, all four circuits that have addressed the issue
interpret the FTAIA as a substantive statute.  The Second, Third, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits all agree that the FTAIA is not jurisdictional and reaches
the merits of the antitrust claim.57  The implications of this distinction are
minimal but not insignificant.
A. History: The FTAIA Before Arbaugh
Prior to Arbaugh, the FTAIA was widely considered a limitation on sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.58  Both Hartford Fire59 and Empagran II60 were
decided prior to Arbaugh.  Neither of these cases directly addressed whether
the FTAIA dealt with the substantive merits of an antitrust claim or whether it
embodied a limit on subject matter jurisdiction.  Yet Hartford Fire’s discussion
was focused on determining whether the district court should refrain from
exercising “jurisdiction” over the antitrust claims.61  In Empagran II, the
defendants moved to dismiss for both lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim.62  The Supreme Court did not address the distinction
in F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran I),63 but on remand,
the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.64
These cases represent federal court practice before the decision in
Arbaugh.65  During the time period after the passing of the FTAIA but before
the decision in Arbaugh, courts did not always clearly distinguish between
their analyses under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions, and as a result the relia-
bility of these holdings is questionable.66  In order to address the issue of
56 See infra Section III.B.
57 See infra Section III.C.
58 Franz, supra note 44, at 863.
59 Harford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
60 Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
61 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 769–70 (stating that “a group of foreign defendants argues
that the principle of international comity requires the District Court to refrain from exer-
cising jurisdiction over certain claims against it” and concluding that “the principle of
international comity does not preclude District Court jurisdiction over the foreign conduct
alleged”).
62 Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1269; see also Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd.,
No. civ.001686TFH, 2001 WL 761360, at *1 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001) (describing the defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss).
63 F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran I), 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
64 Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155; Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1269.
65 See Franz, supra note 44, at 868–69 (citing Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1269; McBee v.
Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 122–23 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379
F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319, 1329–30 (11th
Cir. 2003); Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d
712, 717 (6th Cir. 2003); United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942,
951–52 (7th Cir. 2003); Turicentro S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir.
2002); Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd, 299 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2002); Kruman
v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2002); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v.
HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2001)).
66 Franz, supra note 44, at 869.
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when statutes are jurisdictional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Arbaugh.67
B. Arbaugh
The Supreme Court decided Arbaugh in 2006.68  It was the first of a
series of decisions seeking to establish a standard for determining when a
statute imposed a jurisdictional limitation as opposed to an additional ele-
ment of a claim.69  In Arbaugh, the plaintiff was an employee who brought an
action against her employer for sexual harassment under Title VII.70  After
the jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, the defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.71  The motion was based on a
limitation in the statute that required an employer to have fifteen employees
or more on its payroll.72  The trial court vacated the judgment, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari,73 acknowledg-
ing that the Court had been “less than meticulous” when distinguishing
between language that was jurisdictional and language that imposed an addi-
tional element of a claim for relief.74  The Court laid down a “bright line”
rule: “If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s
scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly
instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.”75  Ultimately, the
Court determined that the statute at issue imposed an additional element to
the claim rather than a jurisdictional limitation.76
C. Post-Arbaugh Agreement
All four of the circuits that have directly addressed the substantive/juris-
dictional issue after the decision in Arbaugh have held that the requirements
of the statute are substantive and go to the merits of the claim.  Prior to the
67 Id. at 873.
68 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
69 Franz, supra note 44, at 873.  “Arbaugh set forth a seemingly bright-line ‘clearly
states’ test, but that test was subsequently modified by later applications that made clear
that the Court was not embracing a categorical approach.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
Arbaugh was later refined by a number of cases. Id. at 875–80.  The most important of
these with respect to the FTAIA was the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd. Id. at 878.  In determining whether a statute was jurisdictional,
the Court reasoned that “to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct
§ 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question.” Id. at 878 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010)).  “The FTAIA fits neatly into this formula . . . .” Id. at
886; see also Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(noting that the case at bar was difficult to distinguish from Morrison).
70 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503–04.
71 Id. at 504.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 509.
74 Id. at 511.
75 Id. at 515–16 (footnote omitted).
76 Id. at 516.
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recent decisions in United States v. Hui Hsiung77 and Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai
Precision Industry Co.,78 the Ninth and Second Circuits treated the FTAIA as
jurisdictional in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies79 and Filetech S.A. v. France
Telecom S.A.,80 respectively.  Notably, both of those decisions were made
before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Arbaugh.  On the other hand,
the Seventh and Third Circuits, in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.81 and
Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp.82 respectively, relied on
Arbaugh in holding that the FTAIA went to the merits of an antitrust claim
and was not jurisdictional in nature.
The Second Circuit in Lotes specifically overruled Filetech and held that
the requirements of the FTAIA “go to the merits of an antitrust claim rather
than to subject matter jurisdiction.”83  In Lotes, the plaintiff was a Universal
Serial Bus (USB) connector manufacturer that alleged that defendants used
the threat of litigation to put their business at risk and establish a monopoly
on the market.84  The court relied on Arbaugh in overruling its precedent
and reasoned that “nothing in the statute ‘speak[s] in jurisdictional terms or
refer[s] in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.’”85  Accordingly,
the statute refers to elements of a claim, not limitations on jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit in Hui Hsiung did not specifically overrule LSL Bio-
technologies but nonetheless held that the FTAIA imposed substantive require-
ments rather than jurisdictional limitations.86  In LSL Biotechnologies, there
was no discussion about whether the statute was jurisdictional in nature; the
court assumed that it encompassed jurisdictional limitations.87  As a result,
the court in that case concluded that the FTAIA was not satisfied and there-
fore the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign restraint of
trade.88  When confronted with the issue again in In re Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, the court declined to resolve the ques-
tion.89  Finally, in Hui Hsiung, the Ninth Circuit directly addressed whether
the FTAIA was jurisdictional.  Citing intervening Supreme Court precedent
and relying on the decisions in the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, the
Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he FTAIA does not limit the power of the federal
77 758 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2014).
78 753 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2014).
79 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
80 157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998).
81 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
82 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
83 Lotes, 753 F.3d at 405.
84 Id. at 399–401.
85 Id. at 405 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)).
86 United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014).
87 Id.
88 United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2004).
89 Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d at 1087 (citing In re Dynamic Random Access Memory
(DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 985 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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courts; rather, it provides substantive elements under the Sherman Act in
cases involving nonimport trade with foreign nations.”90
D. Implications of Substantive Interpretation
An interpretation that the FTAIA is a substantive statute that reaches the
merits of a claim would have the following effects.  First, the complaint would
be attacked under a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as
opposed to a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.91  This will subject a pleading under the FTAIA to the heightened
requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal92 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.93  Sec-
ond, the burden will rest on defendants to prove that no genuine issue of
material fact exists rather than requiring the plaintiff to establish that the
court has subject matter jurisdiction.94  Finally, courts may no longer dismiss
actions sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.95
IV. TWO CAUSAL INQUIRIES: “DIRECT . . . EFFECT” AND “GIVES RISE TO”
The FTAIA requires two separate causal inquiries when determining
whether a foreign activity falls within the domestic effects exception of the
statute.  The first inquiry requires that the foreign activity have a “direct, sub-
stantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce.96  The
circuits disagree over the standard necessary to satisfy this prong of the
FTAIA.  The Second Circuit requires that there exist a reasonably proximate
causal nexus between the foreign anticompetitive activity and the domestic
effect felt in the United States.97  Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit has held
that an effect is “direct” only if it follows as an immediate consequence of the
foreign activity.98  The Second Circuit’s proximate cause standard is the
appropriate one for reasons that will be discussed below.  The second causal
inquiry requires that the domestic effect—assuming that there is one under
the first inquiry—“give rise to” a Sherman Act claim.99  Since the Supreme
Court’s holding in Empagran I, courts have consistently held that in order to
satisfy this prong of the FTAIA, a plaintiff must establish that the domestic
effect proximately caused his injury.100
90 Id. at 1088.
91 Franz, supra note 44, at 896.
92 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
93 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
94 Franz, supra note 44, at 896.  Accordingly, if a plaintiff survives a 12(b)(6) motion,
the defendants will have to go through a lengthy and expensive discovery process. Id.
95 Sylvie K. Kern, The FTAIA—A Changing Landscape, COMPETITION, Spring 2012, at 1,
13.
96 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012).
97 Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2014).
98 United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1094 (9th Cir. 2014).
99 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2).
100 See infra Section IV.A.
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A. “Gives Rise to”: A Domestic Effect Must Proximately
Cause the Plaintiff’s Injury
The most significant Supreme Court case following the passing of the
FTAIA was Empagran I.101 Empagran I addressed the second requirement of
the FTAIA—when an effect “gives rise to” a Sherman Act claim.  The ques-
tion presented in Empagran I was whether “anticompetitive price-fixing activ-
ity that [was] in significant part foreign, that cause[d] some domestic
antitrust injury, and that independently cause[d] separate foreign injury”
gave rise to a Sherman Act claim for a foreign plaintiff.102  The case involved
an antitrust action brought on behalf of domestic and foreign purchasers of
vitamins, alleging that the vitamin manufacturers and distributors engaged in
an international price-fixing conspiracy.103  The price-fixing activity led to
higher vitamin prices in the United States and independently led to higher
vitamin prices in other countries as well.104  The plaintiffs originally argued
that because the anticompetitive activity caused a domestic effect, which gave
rise to a Sherman Antitrust claim for a United States entity, the FTAIA excep-
tion was satisfied.105  In other words, if anticompetitive activity that occurred
abroad affected the United States, then affected foreign plaintiffs could sat-
isfy the FTAIA’s “gives rise to” prong by alleging that a Sherman Antitrust Act
claim could be brought by a domestic entity, and therefore the foreign
anticompetitive activity gave rise to the claim.106  The Court rejected the
argument, holding that a domestic purchaser could bring a claim under the
Sherman Act and FTAIA but a foreign purchaser could not bring a claim
based solely on a foreign harm.107  Stated differently, the domestic effect must
give rise to the foreign harm specifically, not a Sherman Act claim generally.
The Court relied on principles of comity, reasoning that it must “construe[ ]
ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations.”108  The Court emphasized that its holding relied
on the fact that the adverse foreign effect was “independent of any adverse
domestic effect.”109
The plaintiffs also advanced an alternative argument.110  They claimed
that the domestic effect in the United States did “give rise to” their injury
because “but for” the raised costs in the United States that resulted from the
price fixing, the price-fixed vitamins would have been undercut by the
United States’ market and therefore they would never have suffered their
101 Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
102 Id. at 158.
103 Id. at 159.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 160.
106 Id. at 159.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 164.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 175.
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injury.111  The Supreme Court remanded to the D.C. Circuit to determine
whether this “but for” condition was sufficient to satisfy the FTAIA’s
requirement.112
When the Supreme Court remanded the case in Empagran I, it was left to
the D.C. Circuit to determine whether “but for” causation was sufficient to
satisfy the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA.113  On remand, the D.C.
Circuit held that “but for” causation was “simply not sufficient to bring anti-
competitive conduct within the FTAIA exception,”114 and that the domestic
effect must proximately cause the plaintiff’s injury in order for it to satisfy the
FTAIA.115  In applying the proximate cause standard, the D.C. Circuit deter-
mined that the domestic effects cited by the plaintiffs did not give rise to
their claims under the Sherman Act.116  The court reasoned that maintain-
ing supercompetitive prices in the United States may have indirectly facili-
tated the increased prices paid by the plaintiffs, but the ultimate cause of the
increased prices was price fixing that occurred outside of the United
States.117  The court also stated that the fact that the defendants “knew or
could foresee the effect of their allegedly anti-competitive activities in the
United States on the [plaintiffs’] injuries abroad or had as a purpose to
manipulate United States trade does not establish that ‘U.S. effects’ proxi-
mately caused the [plaintiffs’] harm.”118
The circuits that have addressed the matter since the decision in
Empagran II have agreed that proximate cause is the proper standard.119  An
almost identical set of facts was present in In re Monosodium Glutamate Anti-
trust Litigation, in which foreign plaintiffs sought to bring a Sherman Act
claim under the FTAIA.120  The plaintiffs contended that the defendants—
foreign sellers—were engaged in global price fixing and that, because of the
domestic effect of higher prices in the United States, the defendants were
able to maintain their supercompetitive prices.121  Therefore, the domestic
effect of higher prices in the United States gave rise to the plaintiffs’
injury.122  Following the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Empagran II, the Eighth
Circuit determined that the domestic effect must be the proximate cause of
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
114 Id. at 1270–71.
115 Id. at 1271.
116 Id.
117 Id.  Supercompetitive pricing, as it is used throughout the Note, refers to pricing
above that which would ordinarily be sustainable in a competitive market.
118 Id.
119 See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 414 (2d Cir. 2014); In re
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir.
2008); In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 538–39 (8th Cir. 2007).
120 In re Monosodium Glutamate, 477 F.3d at 537.
121 Id. at 536–37.
122 Id. at 539.
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the foreign plaintiff’s injury in order to “give rise to” a Sherman Act claim.123
The court then reasoned that while fixed prices in the United States may
have been a necessary part of the price-fixing scheme, it was not significant
enough to be the direct cause, instead constituting “merely one link in the
causal chain.”124
Again, in In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation,
a foreign purchaser alleged that foreign sellers of DRAM artificially inflated
prices through a global price-fixing arrangement.125  The foreign purchaser
advanced the same argument presented in Empagran II, alleging that the
domestic effect of higher prices in the United States allowed the sellers to
maintain supercompetitive prices and therefore caused the foreign pur-
chaser’s injury.126  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in
Empagran II, holding that “but for” causation is insufficient for the FTAIA
and that a proximate cause standard must be applied, as it is the most consis-
tent with principles of comity.127  Applying this standard, the court deter-
mined that the foreign purchasers had not adequately demonstrated that the
domestic effect rather than the overall price-fixing scheme had caused their
injury.128  The court further acknowledged that the U.S. price of DRAM may
have facilitated the existence of supercompetitive prices but was insufficient
to satisfy the proximate cause requirement imposed by the FTAIA.129
Most recently, the Second Circuit in Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus-
try Co.130 also adopted a proximate cause standard for the “gives rise to”
prong of the FTAIA.131  The facts presented in Lotes are distinct from the
cases described above, but the argument and outcome were the same.  In
Lotes, the plaintiff was a Universal Serial Bus (USB) connector manufac-
turer.132  As part of the USB market, competitors worked together to achieve
a universal standard, which is beneficial to both the producers and the con-
sumers.133  The inherent risk in this process is that patent holders may
threaten suit if the universal design potentially infringes their patent.134  In
order to avoid this, parties agree by contract to allow the production of
123 Id. at 538–39.
124 Id. at 540.
125 In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984
(9th Cir. 2008).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 987.  The Ninth Circuit again acknowledged this as the proper standard in
United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1094 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Thus, as we have noted,
‘but for causation cannot suffice for the FTAIA domestic injury exception to apply and
[we] therefore adopt a proximate causation standard.’” (quoting In re DRAM Antitrust
Litig., 546 F.3d at 987) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
128 In re DRAM Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d at 988–89.
129 Id. at 989.
130 753 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2014).
131 Id. at 414.
132 Id. at 399.
133 Id. at 399–400.
134 Id.
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potentially infringing products.135  The plaintiff contended that the parties
had signed such an agreement but that the defendants then used the threat
of litigation to put their business at risk and establish a monopoly on the
market.136  The plaintiff further argued that the foreign activity caused prices
in the United States to increase, constituting a domestic effect and “giving
rise to” a Sherman Act claim.137  Applying the proximate cause standard, the
court held that this argument had the same fatal flaw as those before it.
Higher prices in the United States were not the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff’s injury.  The threatened infringement suit and exclusionary conduct
were the cause of the injury.138  The court further reasoned that if any causal
chain existed, it ran in the opposite direction.139  The exclusionary conduct
hurt the plaintiff, which in turn caused prices in the United States to rise.
This runs entirely counter to the requirement of the FTAIA that the domestic
effect be the cause of the plaintiff’s injury, not the effect of it.
As these cases demonstrate, the circuits are generally in accord with
respect to the proper standard for the second prong of the FTAIA.  In order
for a plaintiff’s injury to “give rise to” a Sherman Act claim, the domestic
effect of foreign anticompetitive conduct must proximately cause the plain-
tiff’s injury.  Notably, at this time, the Seventh Circuit has not expressly
adopted this standard.140  Regardless, this is the appropriate standard.  As
illustrated in the case law above, holding that “but for” causation was suffi-
cient to satisfy the FTAIA would allow entirely foreign plaintiffs to bring a
claim in the United States against entirely foreign defendants simply because
a price-fixing scheme affected the United States economy.  Such a possibility
is inconsistent with the concerns of comity expressed both by Congress when
it passed the FTAIA and Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Hartford
Fire.
B. Interpreting “Direct Effect”
While consensus surrounds the proximate cause standard for the “gives
rise to” prong of the FTAIA, the circuits are split with regard to what stan-
dard appropriately represents the “direct, substantial and reasonably foresee-
able effect” requirement of the FTAIA.  This inquiry is the first in the two-
step dance of the FTAIA.  First, the foreign act must cause a domestic effect.
That domestic effect must then subsequently give rise to a Sherman Act
135 Id.
136 Id. at 400–01.
137 Id. at 414.
138 Id. at 414–15.
139 Id. at 414.
140 The standard was, however, listed as one of the grounds of dismissal in both the
now-vacated Motorola Mobility opinion authored by Judge Posner and in his opinion on
rehearing.  Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.
2014), vacated and reh’g granted, No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. July 1, 2014); Motorola Mobility LLC
v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014).  Judge Posner’s analysis of the issue
however was relatively sparse. See infra subsection V.C.2.
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claim.  Two standards have developed in the circuits for determining when a
foreign action has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
domestic commerce.  The first subsection below will describe the “immediate
consequence” test developed in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies and
employed by the Ninth Circuit.  The second subsection will describe the “rea-
sonably proximate causal nexus” test developed by the Seventh Circuit in
Minn-Chem and adopted by the Second Circuit in Lotes.  The third subsection
will seek to establish that the “reasonably proximate causal nexus” test is the
correct interpretation.
1. The Ninth Circuit’s “Immediate Consequence” Test
In LSL Biotechnologies, LSL Biotechnologies, Inc. (LSL) and Hazera Qual-
ity Seeds, Inc. (Hazera) entered into a joint venture.141  The goal of the ven-
ture was to supply fresh tomatoes to northern states during winter months.142
LSL is an American corporation that develops genetically modified seeds.143
It began working with Hazera to develop a genetically modified tomato seed
that would produce a tomato with a longer shelf life.144  As the relationship
“withered,” litigation ensued.145  Hazera brought suit in Israel, which led to
mediation and an addendum to the original contract.146  The restrictive
clause at issue in this case was included in the agreement, which ultimately
forbade Hazera from competing with LSL in North American markets.147
The United States subsequently filed an antitrust suit claiming that the
restrictive clause was a “naked restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.”148  It alleged that the agreement “has harmed and will





146 Id. at 674–75.
147 Id. at 675.  The agreement read:
Subsequent to the termination of the Agreement hereunder, Hazera shall not
engage, directly or indirectly, alone, with others and/or through third parties, in
the development, production, marketing or other activities involving tomatoes
having any long shelf life qualities.  However, in the event that Hazera shall be
requested by any third party to produce seeds of tomatoes having long shelf life
qualities, Hazera may engage in such activities only if all of the following condi-
tions are met: (A) the subject tomatoes do not have or involve long shelf life
qualities which are included in LSL’s proprietary rights; (B) Hazera shall not
engage in such production prior to the year 2000 or prior to the expiration of 5
years following the termination of the Agreement, whichever occurs later, and
(C) Hazera has obtained LSL’s advanced written consent, which shall not be
unreasonably withheld . . . LSL shall determine whether or not the proposed
cooperation may involve any of its proprietary rights and shall not unreasonably
withhold its consents to such production.
Id.
148 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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continue to harm American consumers by unreasonably reducing competi-
tion to develop better seeds for . . . tomatoes for sale in the United States.”149
Furthermore, “[b]ut for the [restrictive clause], Hazera would likely be a sig-
nificant competitor of [LSL] in North America.”150  As a result of the restric-
tive clause, LSL and the other named defendants collectively held more than
seventy percent of the “fresh market tomato seeds” market.151  The govern-
ment alleged two anticompetitive domestic effects.  First, the restrictive
clause eliminated from the market “one of the few firms with the experience,
track record and know-how” to effectively compete.152  Second, the restric-
tive clause allowed for price fixing because the defendants could charge
more for the seeds or a license to use the seeds than they would be able to if
Hazera could compete in the market.153  LSL moved to dismiss and the dis-
trict court granted the motion.154
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by discussing the history of the Sher-
man Act’s foreign application and prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, focus-
ing on Hartford Fire’s failure to determine whether the FTAIA’s “direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” standard amends existing law
or merely codifies it.155  The court reasoned that if the FTAIA simply codi-
fied prior jurisprudence, then Judge Hand’s intent/effects test would be the
controlling inquiry.156  If, however, the FTAIA amended existing law, the
direct effect standard could be interpreted without reference to the intent/
effects test and a new standard would need to be developed.157  The court
relied on the House Report corresponding to the FTAIA and Congress’s
choice of language to determine that Congress did not intend to codify the
intent/effects test.158  First, the court determined that the purpose of the
FTAIA was “to more clearly establish when antitrust liability attaches to inter-
national business activities.”159  Relying on this purpose, the court concluded
that it would be a “serious departure from the goal of achieving clarity for
149 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 676 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153 Id. at 676.
154 Id.  Initially, the district court split the plaintiff’s claims into foreign and domestic
components.  The court then dismissed the domestic components under a 12(b)(6)
motion for failure to state a claim and dismissed the foreign components under 12(b)(1)
motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
155 Id. at 678.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 678–79.
158 Id. at 679.
159 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2492 (1982)).
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[the court] to conclude that Congress meant only ‘some substantial effect’160
when it said ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect.’”161
Having determined that the FTAIA amends existing law, the court pro-
ceeded to determine that an effect is direct when it “follows as an immediate
consequence of the defendant’s activity.”162  In drawing this conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).  The FSIA states that “immunity does not
extend to commercial conduct ‘outside the territory of the United States . . .
that [ ] causes a direct effect in the United States.’”163  In Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover, the Supreme Court interpreted “direct effect” in the statute to
require that an effect follow as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s
activity.164  Relying on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “direct
effect” language used in the FSIA, the court determined that “direct” in the
FTAIA requires that the domestic effect be the “immediate consequence” of
the foreign action.165  The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
rejected the assertion that the term “direct” contains any unexpressed
requirement of substantiality or foreseeability.166  Instead, the “immediate
consequence” inquiry focuses on “the spatial and temporal separation
between the defendant’s conduct and the relevant effect.”167
The court then proceeded to apply this standard to the facts at bar and
determined that the domestic effect was not the immediate consequence of
the foreign action.  As outlined above, the government asserted that the
restrictive clause had two domestic effects:
160 Id. (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993)).  This
would be the result of the codification of Alcoa and the subsequent caselaw related to
applying the Sherman Act abroad.
161 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012)).
162 Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
163 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
Section 1605(a)(2) reads in full:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case—
. . .
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (emphasis added).
164 Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992); see also LSL Biotechnologies,
379 F.3d at 680.
165 LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 680.
166 Id.  Incredibly, the court does not address why the “substantial” and “reasonably
foreseeable” qualifiers are included in the language of the statute.  For further analysis of
this discrepancy, see infra subsection V.B.1.
167 Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d Cir. 2014)
(describing LSL Biotechnologies’ immediate consequence standard).
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(1) the agreement makes less likely possible innovations from Hazera in the
creation of heartier tomato seeds that will allow consumers to enjoy higher
quality, better tasting winter tomatoes and that will allow United States farm-
ers to grow long shelf-life tomatoes, and (2) the Restrictive Clause may also
allow defendants to profitably charge more for their seeds (or more for a
license to use seeds with the RIN gene) than they otherwise could.168
With respect to the first potential effect, the court reasoned that there is
no evidence that Hazera could compete with LSL in North America given
LSL’s patent and intellectual property rights.169  Furthermore, no evidence
was provided that Hazera was in a better position to compete with LSL than
other players in the market were.170  The court concluded by stating that
“any innovation that Hazera would bring to American consumers is specula-
tive at best and doubtful at worst.”171  The “effect cannot be ‘direct’ where it
depends on such uncertain intervening developments.”172  Two points
undermined the government’s second allegation that LSL would artificially
raise prices.  First, the government produced no evidence that LSL had
inflated or would have inflated the prices it charged for its proprietary
seeds.173  Second, the United States had recently made an agreement with
Mexican farmers to set a floor price on tomatoes shipped from Mexico to the
United States, thereby artificially raising the price of tomatoes themselves,
despite the cost of the seeds to the farmers.174  As a result of this reasoning,
the Ninth Circuit determined that the government failed to establish there
was a direct domestic effect that resulted from the restrictive clause.  There-
fore, the court dismissed the case for failure to satisfy the FTAIA’s direct
effect requirement.175
The “immediate consequence” standard was reaffirmed by the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Hui Hsiung.176  In that case, the defendants were a
group of LCD panel manufacturers who allegedly conspired to artificially
inflate the price of LCD panels.  The defendants were indicted for violating
the Sherman Act.177  Two categories of LCD panels were involved in the case:
those that were directly imported into the United States, and those sold
168 LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 681 (quoting Complaint, United States v. LSL Bio-





172 Id.  The court goes on to note that there may be situations where the exclusion of a
foreign competitor could result in a “direct” effect.  The court gives the example of a com-
petitor who has a competitive product already developed.  The court even posits that a
competitor who can demonstrate that less investment has been made in research and
development as a result of their exclusion from the market. Id.
173 Id. at 682.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 683.
176 758 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2014).
177 Id. at 1077–79.
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abroad and incorporated into finished products that customers in the United
States would purchase.178  The imported panels fell outside the FTAIA and
were therefore subject to the Sherman Act.179  The panels sold abroad and
eventually purchased in the United States fell under the FTAIA, and there-
fore the United States was required to prove the anticompetitive activity had
a “direct” effect on domestic commerce.180  The court stated that conduct
has a “direct” effect “if it follows as an immediate consequence of the defen-
dant[’s] activity.”181  Ultimately, the court declined to determine whether
the foreign sales of the panels and their subsequent incorporation into goods
sold in the United States was sufficiently “direct.”  Instead, the court deter-
mined that the verdict could be sustained solely on the grounds that the
imported panels violated the Sherman Act.182
2. The “Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus” Test
The Seventh Circuit addressed how to interpret the FTAIA’s “direct . . .
effect”183 requirement in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.184  In Minn-Chem,
the plaintiffs brought a Sherman Antitrust claim against the defendants—a
group of foreign potash producers.  The plaintiffs were domestic potash pur-
chasers who alleged that the producers participated in a global conspiracy to
fix potash prices by restraining output to artificially raise prices.185  The com-
plaint alleged that over approximately five years potash prices had increased
at least 600%.  The evidence strongly suggested that this was not the result of
178 Id. at 1090–92.  The court noted that “import trade” as used in the FTAIA means
what it says: “ ‘[T]ransactions that are directly between the [U.S.] plaintiff purchasers and
the defendant cartel members are the import commerce of the United States.’ . . . So too
are transactions between the foreign defendant producers of TFT-LCDs and purchasers
located in the United States.” Id. at 1090 (quoting Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683
F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
179 Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d at 1091–92.  Keep in mind that the FTAIA places all conduct
involving trade with foreign nations outside of the Sherman Act except for import trade or
qualifying conduct under the domestic effects exception.  Therefore, import commerce
falls outside the FTAIA and is therefore subject to the Sherman Act. See supra Part II.
180 Id. at 1092.  The United States would also have had to prove that the “direct” effect
“gives rise to” a Sherman Act claim, a standard discussed infra in Section IV.A, and the
court ultimately declined to apply the FTAIA because the imported panels were sufficient
to sustain the verdict in the case. Id. at 1094.
181 Id. at 1094 (quoting United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 674,
680–81 (9th Cir. 2004)).
182 Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d at 1094.  The court noted:
We need not determine the outer bounds of import trade by considering whether
commerce directed at, but not consummated within, an import market is also
outside the scope of the FTAIA’s import provisions because at least a portion of
the transactions here involves the heartland situation of the direct importation of
foreign goods into the United States.
Id. at 1090 n.7.
183 15 U.S.C § 6a(1) (2012).
184 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
185 Id. at 848.
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normal market fluctuation.186  The court began by determining the appro-
priate interpretation of the FTAIA’s “direct effect” language.187  It then
applied this standard to the factual scenario present in the case.
The Seventh Circuit adopted the “reasonably proximate causal nexus”
interpretation of “direct . . . effect” in Minn-Chem.188  The court began its
analysis with the language of the statute—“direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable.”189  The court then established that the foreign activity’s effect
on domestic commerce was clearly substantial.190  The complaint alleged
that 5.3 million tons of potash was imported into the United States in 2008
and that the price by that time had increased 600% over the previous five
years.191  Next, the court reasoned that the foreseeability requirement was
easily met.192  The cartel controlled 71% of the world’s supply of a homoge-
nous commodity and was charging supercompetitive prices for that commod-
ity.193  Without any evidence of potentially undercutting the price (none was
presented), the expected outcome is that consumers would pay artificially
inflated prices for the commodity.194
Finally, the court addressed the meaning of “direct” as used in the stat-
ute.  The court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “immediate consequence” inter-
pretation presented in LSL Biotechnologies and embraced the “reasonably
proximate causal nexus” interpretation advanced by the Department of Jus-
tice’s Antitrust Division.195  The court began by stating that the Ninth Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court’s definition of “direct” in the FSIA in determin-
ing that “direct” meant “immediate consequence.”196  The Seventh Circuit
further noted that when the Supreme Court interpreted the term “direct” in
the FSIA, it adopted the immediate consequence definition only after refus-
ing to impute unexpressed substantiality and foreseeability requirements
onto the definition of “direct.”197  Unlike the FSIA, the court in Minn-Chem
reasoned, there was no need to impute these requirements onto the FTAIA;
186 Id. at 849.
187 Id. at 856.  The Seventh Circuit acknowledges that purchases directly from the pro-
ducers would constitute import commerce and would not need to satisfy the domestic
effects exception of the FTAIA. Id. at 855.  However, because some of the named defend-
ants included firms whose activities fell outside of the import transactions categorization, it
was necessary to determine whether the conduct satisfied the “direct . . . effect” require-
ment of the FTAIA. Id. at 855–56.  One example of a defendant the court mentioned was
Canpotex, which acted as a marketing and sales agent and whose actions were an impor-
tant element of the price inflation scheme. Id.
188 Id. at 857.
189 Id. at 854.
190 Id. at 859.
191 Id. at 849.
192 Id. at 859.
193 Id. at 849.
194 Id. at 858–59.
195 Id. at 857.
196 Id. at 856.
197 Id. at 857.
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instead, Congress expressly included them in the statute.198  The court
concluded:
The word “direct” addresses the classic concern about remoteness—a con-
cern, incidently [sic], that has been at the forefront of international antitrust
law at least since Judge Hand wrote in Alcoa that “[w]e should not impute to
Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct
which has no consequences within the United States.”199
Applying this standard, the court determined that the effects of the for-
eign cartel’s actions were sufficiently “direct” to satisfy the FTAIA’s require-
ment.200  As alleged by the plaintiffs, the defendants restricted supply in
order to set artificially high prices for potash.  The court reasoned that “[i]t is
no stretch to say that the foreign supply restrictions, and the concomitant
price increases forced upon the Chinese purchasers, were a direct—that is,
proximate—cause of the subsequent price increases in the United States.”201
The Seventh Circuit then affirmed the order of the district court denying the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.202
The Second Circuit was the most recent circuit court to address the
FTAIA’s direct effect requirement.  In Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry
Co., the Second Circuit adopted a proximate causation standard for the
FTAIA’s “direct . . . effect” requirement.203  Recall that in Lotes, the plaintiff
was a USB connector manufacturer that contended it signed an agreement
with the defendants that would allow the plaintiffs to produce USB technol-
ogy without being sued for patent infringement.  The plaintiff further
alleged that despite this agreement, the defendants used the threat of patent
litigation to put its business at risk and establish a monopoly on the
market.204
In an analysis substantially similar to the Seventh Circuit’s in Minn-Chem,
the court in Lotes rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “direct” in the
FTAIA.  The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court arrived at its defi-
nition of “direct” in Weltover after determining that there was no unexpressed
requirement of substantiality or foreseeability.205  On the other hand, the
FTAIA expressly requires substantiality and foreseeability.206  Next, the court
applied the “cardinal principle of statutory construction,” reasoning that if
“direct” requires an immediate consequence, the reasonable foreseeability
198 Id.
199 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)).
200 Id. at 859–60.
201 Id. at 859.
202 Id. at 861.
203 See Lotes Co v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2014).
204 Id. at 399–401.  For a more robust description of the factual scenario present in
Lotes, see text accompanying notes 130–39.
205 Id. at 411.
206 Id.
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requirement present in the statute would be rendered superfluous.207  Third,
the court noted that courts have a great deal of experience applying proxi-
mate cause standards.  This is significantly more useful than LSL Biotechnolo-
gies’ immediate consequence standard, which focuses on spatial and
temporal separation between the conduct and effect.208
Most importantly, the court in Lotes acknowledged that the “complex
manufacturing process” at issue in the case “is increasingly common in our
modern global economy, and [that] antitrust law has long recognized that
anticompetitive injuries can be transmitted through multi-layered supply
chains.”209  These harms would be unreachable under an immediate conse-
quence interpretation of the FTAIA’s direct effect requirement.  The court
further stated that “[t]here is nothing inherent in the nature of outsourcing
or international supply chains that necessarily prevents the transmission of
anticompetitive harms or renders any and all domestic effects impermissibly
remote and indirect.”210  This language suggests that given an appropriate
factual scenario, the court would hold sufficiently proximate an anticompeti-
tive harm that permeated a global supply chain.  Moreover, the court recog-
nized this type of anticompetitive harm as a real threat, stating that it
“expect[ed] that some perpetrators will design foreign anticompetitive
schemes for the very purpose of causing harmful downstream effects in the
United States.”211  Ultimately, the discussion is dicta, as the court in Lotes
declined to determine whether the facts presented established a “direct”
effect under the FTAIA.212  The court instead determined that the effect did
not “give[ ] rise to” the plaintiff’s claims.213  Nonetheless, the court laid
groundwork for future cases involving antitrust harms passed through a
global supply chain.
3. “Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus” Is the Appropriate Standard
First, a proximate cause standard should be adopted because it is most
consistent with the statutory language.  Second, concerns for international
comity should not bear as much weight in this inquiry, as they are sufficiently
addressed by the requirement that the domestic effect “give rise to” the Sher-
man Act claim.  Third, a proximate cause standard is necessary to protect
American interests in an ever-expanding global economy that relies on com-
plex global supply chains for efficiency and success.  These considerations
weigh heavily in favor of a proximate cause analysis, and therefore the cir-
cuits should follow the precedent in Minn-Chem and Lotes and hold that the
207 Id. (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
208 Id. at 411–12.
209 Id. at 412.
210 Id. at 413.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 413–15 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2012)).
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FTAIA’s direct effect prong is satisfied when the foreign action is the proxi-
mate cause of the domestic effect.
Interpreting “direct” in the FTAIA to require a “reasonably proximate
causal nexus” is most consistent with the text of the statute.  The FTAIA
couples “direct” with additional substantiality and foreseeability require-
ments.  These qualifiers lend weight to a proximate cause interpretation
because the three statutory requirements—“direct,” “foreseeable,” and “sub-
stantial”—are regularly used to determine the limits of proximate causa-
tion.214  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statutory
language is untenable.  As the Ninth Circuit interprets the FTAIA direct
effect requirement, the domestic effect must be an “immediate consequence”
of the foreign action.215  This reading of the statute necessarily dismisses—as
the Ninth Circuit acknowledges216—any “substantial” or “reasonably foresee-
able” requirement.  This directly conflicts with the language of the statute.
Unlike the FSIA, there is no need to read into the statute requirements of
substantiality and foreseeability because Congress expressly included those
requirements in its text.  Congress would not have qualified the term “direct”
if it did not intend the effect to be “substantial” or “reasonably foresee-
able.”217  As a result, a proximate cause standard is more consistent with the
language of the statute than the immediate consequence standard.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute makes the
“substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” language superfluous.  It is a
well-known canon of statutory interpretation that if two interpretations are
possible and one results in superfluity while another does not, then the inter-
pretation that gives effect to all of the language in the statute is favored.218  If
a “direct” effect is defined to require an immediate consequence and noth-
214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (“The actor’s negligent conduct
is a legal cause of harm to another if . . . his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm . . . .” (emphasis added)); Proximate Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009) (“A cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability . . . [a]lso termed (in both
senses) direct cause . . . .”); D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence
and Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942, § 1 (1965) (“[M]any courts also regard ‘foreseeability’
to be an essential element in the definition of ‘proximate cause . . . .’” (emphasis added)).
215 United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004).  The Ninth
Circuit also defined “direct” as “the spatial and temporal separation between the defen-
dant’s conduct and the relevant effect.” Lotes, 753 F.3d at 412 (describing the LSL Biotech-
nologies test).  It is difficult to understand why either of these two factors—time and space—
would be legally significant in assessing whether a legally cognizable harm has occurred in
an antitrust setting.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit gives no guidance as to why these factors
are or should be legally relevant.  The use of this test would be especially unusual when the
alternative is a proximate cause standard, whose entire purpose is to distinguish between
those harms that are recognizable at law and those that are too attenuated to give rise to a
cause of action.
216 LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 680.
217 Reasonable foreseeability is also often used when determining whether an action is
the proximate cause of an effect, further demonstrating that a better interpretation of the
language results in a proximate cause standard. See Buckner, supra note 214, § 1.
218 Lotes, 753 F.3d at 411 (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 24 10-JUL-15 12:46
2086 notre dame law review [vol. 90:5
ing more, there is no need for the substantiality and foreseeability language.
This is especially true with respect to reasonable foreseeability.  An “immedi-
ate consequence” is well beyond being reasonably foreseeable; instead, an
“immediate consequence” is almost certain to happen.  Stated differently, an
immediate consequence is always reasonably foreseeable, but a reasonably
foreseeable consequence, while necessary for an immediate consequence, is
not always an immediate consequence.  As a result, an “immediate conse-
quence” interpretation of “direct” completely discards the need for a “rea-
sonably foreseeable” requirement and renders it superfluous.  Therefore,
because an “immediate consequence” interpretation will result in superflu-
ous language in the statute, the proximate cause interpretation should be
adopted.
Instead of abiding by this canon of statutory construction, the Ninth Cir-
cuit appears to rely on the canon of consistent usage and uses the definition
of “direct” declared by the Supreme Court in relation to the FSIA.219  While
the FSIA does relate substantially in subject matter,220 it is an entirely differ-
ent statute.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the meanings of
words can vary greatly from statute to statute.221  Thus, because giving
“direct” a different meaning than it has in the FSIA does not violate a canon
of construction and giving it the same meaning creates superfluity in the
statute, “direct” should be defined as requiring proximate causation.
Moreover, applying a proximate cause standard for the “direct” effect
requirement of the FTAIA adequately accounts for concerns of international
comity.  By applying a proximate cause standard for the “gives rise to” prong
of the FTAIA, the courts ensure that a plaintiff’s claim is the result of an
effect on commerce in the United States.  This requirement alone is suffi-
cient to ensure that the United States antitrust laws do not overreach into the
sovereignty of other nations.  As currently interpreted, only a plaintiff whose
injury results from an anticompetitive effect in the United States—e.g., the
purchase of artificially inflated priced goods from the U.S. market—will
result in a cause of action under the “gives rise to” limitation.  The courts
have held that neither a price-fixing scheme that causes the United States
market to be artificially inflated, thereby maintaining the inflated price
throughout the world, nor the purchase of price-fixed items abroad and the
eventual effect of that artificial inflation on the United States market is suffi-
cient to “give rise to” a Sherman Act claim.  As a result, the “gives rise to”
219 LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 680.
220 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act “‘codifies foreign nations’ sovereign immu-
nity from suit, and ‘provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
the courts of this country.’” Lotes, 753 F.3d at 410 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amer-
ada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)).
221 “Most words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously
construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once
in the same statute or even the same section.”  Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S.
561, 574 (2007) (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433
(1932)).
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limitation effectively eliminates all claims except those stemming from effects
in the U.S. market—which, while some may have international implications,
are clearly of sufficient U.S. interest to provide remedies in U.S. courts.  As
the Supreme Court stated in Empagran I, “application of our antitrust laws to
foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable, and hence consis-
tent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative
effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive con-
duct has caused.”222
A proximate cause standard also has practical advantages over the direct
effects standard.  The purpose of antitrust law is to protect American con-
sumers from anticompetitive activity.223  Global supply chains are prevalent
in the market and anticompetitive harms that occur along the way will often
be transferred downstream to consumers.224  Therefore, antitrust law should
protect domestic victims of this anticompetitive activity.  However, due to the
nature of global supply chains, an “immediate consequence” standard would
be insufficient to adequately protect American plaintiffs.  Because there are
often multiple links in the global supply chain, a number of harms that are
eventually passed onto American consumers will not be the “immediate con-
sequence” of the anticompetitive activity.  As the Second Circuit stated in
Lotes, it is a real possibility “that some perpetrators will design foreign
anticompetitive schemes for the very purpose of causing harmful down-
stream effects in the United States.”225  Under the immediate consequence
standard, these harms will go without remedy because foreign defendants will
be able to hide behind the layers of the American plaintiff’s supply chain.
This does not have to be the case.226  As argued above, applying a proximate
cause standard for the “direct . . . effects” prong of the FTAIA will not pre-
vent the courts from respecting international comity because they can rely on
the “gives rise to” prong to filter out foreign plaintiffs seeking a forum in the
United States.  As a result, the remaining plaintiffs have established that the
domestic effect of the defendant’s conduct gave rise to their antitrust claim
and need only establish that the defendant’s conduct had a sufficiently
“direct” effect on the U.S. market.  By applying a proximate cause standard at
this point, the court may acknowledge the ubiquity of global supply chains
and the need for some protection of American plaintiffs and consumers,
while still preventing the use of the United States as a forum for claims in
which the United States has little to no vested interest in their outcomes.
222 Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
223 “Everyone is a consumer, and the most egregious form[s] of anticompetitive behav-
ior . . . harm[ ] consumers without justification.  It raises the prices they pay, transfers their
wealth to the conspirators, and rarely, if ever, has redeeming virtues.  The most basic pur-
pose of antitrust law is to protect consumers from such behavior.”  John B. Kirkwood, The
Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2426 (2013) (referencing price fixing).
224 Lotes, 753 F.3d at 413.
225 Id.
226 To so hold would truly be a backward step toward American Banana, a concern for-
warded in Bauer, supra note 20.
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V. MOTOROLA MOBILITY
As introduced above, Motorola Mobility was an antitrust case brought
under the Sherman Act and the FTAIA.227  At the district court, the plaintiff,
Motorola, lost on summary judgment for failing to satisfy the domestic effects
exception of the FTAIA.  Motorola appealed to the Seventh Circuit.  The Sev-
enth Circuit decided the case originally in March 2014.  It vacated this opin-
ion and granted rehearing in November 2014, and after further briefing and
oral argument, the Seventh Circuit again affirmed the district court’s
holding.
A. Factual Background
Motorola Mobility involved Motorola, the parent company, whose foreign
subsidiaries were part of a global supply chain involved in the production of
mobile phones.  The defendants in the litigation allegedly participated in
anticompetitive conduct by fixing the prices of a necessary component of the
mobile phones, LCD screens.228  The purchase of the LCD panels at issue in
this case can be divided into three distinct categories:
(1) purchases of LCD panels by Motorola that were delivered directly to
Motorola facilities in the United States (“Category I”); (2) purchases of LCD
panels by Motorola’s foreign affiliates that were delivered to the foreign affil-
iates’ manufacturing facilities abroad, where they were incorporated into
mobile phones that were later sold in the United States (“Category II”); and
(3) purchases of LCD panels by Motorola’s foreign affiliates that were deliv-
ered to the foreign affiliates’ manufacturing facilities abroad and were later
incorporated into mobile phones sold outside the United States (“Category
III”).229
The purchases in total cost Motorola over $5 billion; however, of that
amount, only one percent were actually purchased by Motorola—those
purchases falling under Category I.230  The remaining ninety-nine percent of
the purchases were made by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries—those
described in Categories II and III.231  It was not disputed that the Category I
purchases were subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act.232
The issue was whether price fixing the Category II and/or Category III
panels was actionable under the Sherman Act.  Motorola asserted that the
negotiations occurred for the purchase of the price-fixed panels in the
United States.  The purchase of the panels, however, took place between
227 See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text.
228 Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09 C 6610, 2014 WL 258154, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014).
229 Id. at *1–3.
230 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842, 843 (7th Cir. 2014),
vacated and reh’g granted, No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. July 1, 2014).
231 Id.
232 Id. at 844.
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Motorola’s subsidiaries abroad and the foreign defendants.233  These panels
were then “immediately” incorporated into mobile phones and shipped to
the United States—Category II panels—or to other locations—Category III
panels.234
B. Vacated Opinion
The Seventh Circuit’s vacated opinion affirmed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment.  First, the court reasoned that the domestic effect was
“indirect—or ‘remote.’”235  The court reasoned that the “effect of compo-
nent price fixing on the price of the product of which it is a component is
indirect.”236  The court distinguished the facts from those in Minn-Chem, rea-
soning that in Minn-Chem, the cartel took steps to inflate the price of a “prod-
uct that [was] wanted in the United States, and then (after succeeding in
doing so) sold that product to U.S. customers.”237  Alternatively, the defendants
in this case caused a rise in price after the sale of the products to foreign
customers.  Moreover, the court held that Motorola’s claim failed to satisfy
the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA.  The court determined that
Motorola could not be sued “by its U.S. customers for an antitrust offense
merely because the prices it charges for devices that include such compo-
nents may be higher than they would be were it not for the price fixing.”238
Therefore, the “effect in the United States of the price fixing could not give
rise to an antitrust claim.”239  The court concluded by noting the prevalence
of global supply chains in the current economy240 and predicted that to
extend application of the Sherman Act to the activities of the defendants in
this case would result in an “enormous[ ] increase [in] the global reach of
the Sherman Act, creating friction with many foreign countries.”241
C. Rehearing
1. Motorola’s Argument
Motorola alleged that summary judgment was improperly granted
because it had a valid claim under the Sherman Act.  Motorola asserted that
the fact that the panels were purchased and delivered abroad was not disposi-
233 Id. at 843–44.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 844.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 844 (quoting Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir.
2012) (en banc)).
238 Id. at 845.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 846 (citing DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40167, GLOBALIZED SUP-
PLY CHAINS AND U.S. POLICY 4–10 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R401
67_20100127.pdf; Gregory Tassey, Competing in Advanced Manufacturing: The Need for
Improved Growth Models and Policies, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 31–35 (2014)).
241 Id. at 846.
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tive.242  It further asserted that the Sherman Act applied because there was
an anticompetitive effect on Motorola and United States consumers.243  Spe-
cifically, Motorola claimed that the price-fixing activity abroad raised the
prices of mobile phones in the United States, thereby directly causing a
domestic effect and satisfying the direct effect requirement of the FTAIA.244
It further maintained that “defendants affected [United States] commerce by
negotiating, in the United States, the price for all panels . . . and that this
effect on U.S. prices gave rise to any allegedly foreign injuries because the
same price was applied to Motorola’s purchases at its subsidiaries abroad.”245
Motorola concluded that this satisfied the proximate cause standard of the
“gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA because the foreign and domestic
prices “arise from the same, plaintiff-specific negotiations and acts of conspira-
torial price-fixing.”246  Because the FTAIA was satisfied, the motion for sum-
mary judgment should have been reversed.
2. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion after rehearing generally followed the
same line of reasoning as its vacated opinion, but it failed to provide much
substantive analysis of the FTAIA and its requirements.  With respect to the
direct effect requirement of the FTAIA, the court assumed without deciding
that the activity at issue was sufficiently direct.247  The court did not expressly
adopt a test for the first prong of the FTAIA and therefore did not apply
either the proximate cause standard or the immediate consequence stan-
dard.  Instead, the court stated that the facts before it were distinguishable
from those in Minn-Chem—where the Seventh Circuit found the effect suffi-
ciently “direct”—but were not equivalent to what the court said in Minn-Chem
would “definitely block liability under the Sherman Act.”248  As a result, the
court provided no guidance for determining when an effect is “direct” but
simply assumed that Motorola had satisfied the requirement in this case.249
The court also addressed the “gives rise to” requirement and held that
Motorola’s claim failed to satisfy this prong of the FTAIA because it was
injured abroad when it purchased the price-fixed component.250  The court
242 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746
F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003).
243 Id.
244 Id. at 10–12.
245 Id. at 17.
246 Id. at 18.
247 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 773 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2014).
248 Id.
249 Id. (“We’ll assume that the requirement of a direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect on domestic commerce has been satisfied.”).
250 Id. at 823.  That is the extent of the analysis.  The court’s reasoning reads as follows:
“Remember that the [FTAIA] requires that the effect of an anticompetitive practice on
domestic U.S. commerce must, to be subject to the Sherman Act, give rise to an antitrust
cause of action.  [Motorola] . . . would have been injured abroad when [it] purchased the
price-fixed components.” Id.
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did not even acknowledge Motorola’s argument that because the inflated
prices both in the United States and abroad were the result of plaintiff-spe-
cific negotiations that occurred in the United States, the proximate cause
requirement of the “gives rise to” prong of the FTAIA was satisfied.  Instead,
the bulk of the opinion was dedicated to Illinois Brick’s indirect purchaser
doctrine and concerns for international comity.251  Ultimately, the court cor-
rectly ruled for the defendants, but the reasoning of the opinion left a num-
ber of FTAIA questions unanswered and unnecessarily applied the indirect
purchaser doctrine to an FTAIA claim.
D. More FTAIA, Less Illinois Brick
First, because the court failed to mention a standard in both the vacated
opinion and the opinion following rehearing, the Seventh Circuit should
have reaffirmed its holding in Minn-Chem that an effect is “direct” when the
plaintiff establishes a “reasonably proximate causal nexus.”  The court should
have then determined that the foreign anticompetitive activity in this case
proximately caused a domestic effect and therefore that the first prong of the
FTAIA was satisfied—rather than simply assuming it was met.  The Seventh
Circuit correctly stated that the second requirement of the FTAIA—that the
domestic effect “give rise to” a Sherman Act claim—was not satisfied, but only
dedicated a paragraph to this analysis.  Instead of focusing on the indirect
purchaser doctrine—a doctrine that has never before been applied in an
FTAIA analysis252—the court should have analyzed how the facts at bar failed
to satisfy the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA.  In the end, the court
correctly granted summary judgment for the defendants.  However, it should
have focused its analysis as this Note proposes because it complies more con-
sistently with prior precedent, accounts for considerations of comity and for-
eign sovereignty, and does not unnecessarily expand the reach of Illinois Brick
and the indirect purchaser doctrine.
251 Id. at 819–27.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois “limits
private treble damage actions to the antitrust violator’s direct customers, leaving subse-
quent purchasers who often suffer substantial harm without a remedy.”  Matthew M. Duffy,
Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding Exceptions to the Indirect Purchaser
Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1709, 1709 (2012) (citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977)).  The court’s argument in Motorola Mobility is that Motorola, the parent, is a
subsequent purchaser of its subsidiary and as a result, under Illinois Brick, the parent is left
without a remedy. Illinois Brick, of course, did not deal with price fixing as applied to a
global supply chain and there is dicta in that case that might indicate it should not be
applied in Motorola’s situation.  Nevertheless, Illinois Brick’s application is outside the
scope of this Note.  It is sufficient to say that the decision could have been made without
expansion of the doctrine. See supra Section V.C.
252 See supra Parts I–IV.  Moreover, Illinois Brick has not been applied even in cases with
markedly similar factual scenarios. See Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753
F.3d 395 (2d. Cir. 2014).
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1. Proximate Cause Analysis: Direct Effect Requirement Was Satisfied
Proximate cause is generally thought of as a “cause that is legally suffi-
cient to result in liability.”253  Generally, it limits legal responsibilities to
“those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such sig-
nificance that the law is justified in imposing liability.”254  “Some boundary
must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of
some social idea of justice or policy.”255  An action is the proximate cause of
an effect when the conduct is a “substantial factor in bringing about the
harm.”256  When determining whether the conduct was a substantial factor to
bringing about the harm, courts look to factors such as “whether the actor’s
conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and
active operation up to the time of the harm” and a “number of other factors
which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect they
have in producing it.”257  As applied to supply chains, courts should analyze
the “structure” of the supply chain and the “nature of the commercial rela-
tionships at each link in the causal chain.”258
Generally, concerns for international comity limit the extraterritorial
application of United States law—the Seventh Circuit acknowledged this pol-
icy concern in its Motorola Mobility opinion.259  However, concerns for inter-
national comity only need to be addressed by the FTAIA as a whole, not by
each prong of the FTAIA.  If a “direct” effect was the only requirement of the
FTAIA and as a result the only mechanism by which international comity
could be respected, then concerns for comity would and should limit the
proximate cause analysis.  However, concerns of international comity are
properly accounted for in the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA.  By
ensuring that all causes of action arise from a domestic effect under the
“gives rise to” requirement, the United States ensures that it has a proper
interest in the case before it opens the doors of its courts to the claim.
Therefore, because comity is adequately addressed in the second prong of
the statute, the “direct” effects inquiry should be limited by traditional
notions of proximate cause rather than concerns for international comity.
Thus, under the FTAIA courts should determine whether the anticompetitive
action was the substantial, reasonably foreseeable, and direct (or proximate)
cause of the domestic effect.
Here, the anticompetitive activity abroad produced a substantial domes-
tic effect in the United States.  The defendants fixed the price of LCD panels
253 Proximate Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
254 Id.
255 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
256 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
257 Id. § 433.
258 Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 413 (2d Cir. 2014).
259 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 773 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“The Supreme Court has warned that rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. law
‘creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regu-
late its own commercial affairs.’” (quoting Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004))).
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in order to artificially inflate their prices.  Defendants conceded that this
activity had a substantial effect on the market.  Regardless, Motorola pur-
chased $5 billion worth of panels, nearly half of which eventually entered the
United States market.  Therefore, even a small increase in the price of the
panels would have a substantial impact on the market.
Furthermore, it was reasonably foreseeable that the anticompetitive
action would result in a domestic effect.  Basic logic would dictate that
increasing the price of a component part would lead to an increase in price
of the finished product.  Moreover, Motorola alleged that defendants knew
that the LCD panels would reach the market and that they intentionally
targeted the United States market.  Hence, it was reasonably foreseeable to
the defendants that selling LCD panels for an artificially high price with the
intent of them reaching the United States market would have an effect in
that market.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit should have determined that the foreign
defendant’s anticompetitive activity was the direct or proximate cause of the
domestic effect.  The court assumes this in its opinion following rehearing,
but in his vacated opinion, Judge Posner concluded that the domestic effect
was too remote to impose liability because the anticompetitive activity
occurred abroad and then filtered through layers of the supply chain before
causing “a few ripples in the United States.”260  This reasoning, however, fails
to acknowledge the simplicity of the supply chain in this case.  The compo-
nents were purchased at an artificially high price, and those fixed price com-
ponents were incorporated into phones and “immediately” shipped to the
United States.261  As the court in Lotes stated, “[t]here is nothing inherent in
the nature of outsourcing or international supply chains that necessarily pre-
vents the transmission of anticompetitive harms or renders any and all
domestic effects impermissibly remote and indirect.”262  Moreover, this
appears to be a rather simple supply chain: purchasing to manufacturing to
distribution.  The defendant’s conduct was the sole factor in bringing about
the harm.  Furthermore, the defendants were selling into a global supply
chain, and they were aware that this chain was supplying phones to the
United States.263  It was the reasonable consequence of their action that the
United States market would be affected.  Neither the “structure” of the sup-
ply chain nor the “nature of the commercial relationships at each link in the
causal chain”264 provides any evidence that the price-fixing activity was not
the proximate cause of the domestic effect.  In fact, this would appear to be
the exact situation in which anticompetitive activity affecting one link in the
supply chain can be traced through to the domestic effect without concern
260 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc. 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
261 See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 242, at 1–3.
262 Lotes, 753 F.3d at 413.
263 In fact, Motorola alleged that the defendants targeted the United States market.
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 242, at 3.
264 Lotes, 753 F.3d at 413.
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for intervening sales or supply chain complexities.  Consequently, the court
should have found that the anticompetitive activity at issue in this case was
the proximate and therefore “direct” cause of the domestic effect.
2. Motorola Failed to Satisfy the “Gives Rise to” Requirement of the
FTAIA
The circuits to address the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA have
all held that the domestic effect must proximately cause the plaintiff’s injury.
It is insufficient to allege simply that an anticompetitive price-fixing conspir-
acy raised prices in the United States market, thereby causing a domestic
effect, and that because the United States market prices were inflated, the
plaintiff was harmed as a result of the inflated United States prices.265  It is
also insufficient to allege that foreign anticompetitive activity which harms
the plaintiff and subsequently causes a domestic harm “gives rise to” a Sher-
man Act claim under the FTAIA.  That was the case in Lotes, and because the
facts of this case are strikingly similar, the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
that case is particularly persuasive here.
Here, Motorola was injured when it purchased the price-fixed LCD
panels through one of its subsidiaries abroad.  Furthermore, because it over-
paid for the LCD panels, that cost was passed on through its global supply
chain and eventually caused a rise in the price of mobile phones in the
United States.  As described above, this resulted in a sufficiently proximate
domestic effect under the “direct” effect requirement of the FTAIA.  This is
not, however, sufficient to satisfy the “gives rise to” requirement of the stat-
ute.  The harm here occurred when Motorola purchased the LCD panels and
not—as Motorola has argued—when the negotiations occurred because with-
out Motorola’s purchase of price-fixed phones there would never have been
a domestic effect in the United States.  Thus, the price fixing harmed Motor-
ola before it manifested itself in the United States.  Motorola’s injury “gave
rise to” the domestic effect, not vice versa.  Unfortunately for Motorola, this
fact dooms its claim.  The FTAIA requires that the domestic effect “gives rise
to” the Sherman Act claim.  The domestic effect in this case was downstream
of Motorola in the flow of causation.  Consequently, Motorola now finds itself
upstream of the domestic effect and without a paddle.  The Seventh Circuit’s
vacated opinion also reached this conclusion.  Judge Posner reasoned that
Motorola’s claims against the defendants were not based on the rise in price
of the goods in the United States but rather “on the effect of the alleged
price fixing on Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries.”  That price fixing occurred
abroad and was independent of the United States market.  Consequently,
upon rehearing, the Seventh Circuit should have endorsed this line of rea-
soning and held that the domestic effect did not “give rise to” Motorola’s
Sherman Act claim.  Instead, the court dove into an analysis of the indirect
265 See In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2007)
(rejecting this “but for” line of reasoning); Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1270 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (same).
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purchaser doctrine, relying heavily on Illinois Brick to bar recovery by Motor-
ola.  The application of this doctrine was unnecessary because, as argued
above, the FTAIA disposes of Motorola’s claim.266
CONCLUSION
Motorola Mobility provides a case study in the application of domestic
antitrust law to foreign anticompetitive conduct.  Congress enacted the
FTAIA in order to provide guidance to the courts in this regard.  However,
the legislation is ambiguous and the circuits have disagreed on how to inter-
pret the statutory language.  As argued in this Note, the FTAIA should be
interpreted as a substantive limitation on Sherman Act claims that apply to
extraterritorial conduct.  Furthermore, the domestic effects exception should
be construed as a dual proximate cause analysis.  In doing so, the courts
properly account for considerations of international comity while maintain-
ing potential causes of action for United States purchasers affected by
anticompetitive activity abroad.  The prevalence and necessity of global sup-
ply chains in today’s markets weigh strongly against a presumption that
anticompetitive activity occurring somewhere along the chain is too remote
to satisfy the “direct” effect requirement.  This is especially true when consid-
ering that the “gives rise to” limitation ensures that there is an adequate
United States interest in the anticompetitive activity and correspondingly
respects concerns for international comity.  Applying these principles to the
facts presented in Motorola Mobility, the Seventh Circuit should have found
that Motorola’s claim satisfied the direct effect requirement of the domestic
effects exception but failed to satisfy the “gives rise to” requirement.
266 Notably, rather than expansion, some have recognized the failing of Illinois Brick
and have called for broader exceptions “allow[ing] indirect purchasers to sue more fre-
quently.”  Duffy, supra note 251, at 1729.  “By targeting situations where the policy weak-
nesses . . . are most acute, indirect purchasers can and should be successful in seeking
recovery.” Id.  This is perhaps one of those situations but, again, this is a topic for another
note.
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